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Lights, Camera, Action . . . As Long As You
Live in the Proper Circuit: An Analysis
of the Circuit Split Concerning
Civilians’ First Amendment
Right to Record Police Officers
Chloe Cornett*
ABSTRACT
While the United States Circuit Courts are not required to keep their
precedents in synch, there are times when they should be. So-called “circuit
splits” arise when the circuit courts divide themselves in a way that creates
two competing schemes of caselaw. The core question of the split addressed
in this Comment is whether or not there is an established First Amendment
right for civilians to record police officers in public and, if so, whether that
right ultimately defeats the doctrine of qualified immunity. The majority of
circuits hold there is, while the minority point of view holds there is no such
established right. Although the courts can mend the split themselves, this
Comment advocates for the Supreme Court of the United States to assert its
power as the highest court in the land and conclusively mend the split by
holding that citizens have a right a right to record police officers in public
pursuant to the First Amendment. Uniformity, efficacy, and percolation are
advanced when the circuits are aligned. Moreover, the Supreme Court has the
power to bind all courts—whether they have spoken on an issue or not. Public policy concerns, like officer accountability and the societal inequalities
pertaining to the dissemination of information, and the essential foundations
of our Constitution require the Supreme Court to enforce what most circuit
courts already hold: First Amendment protections afford Americans the right
to film law enforcement as we find them.
I. INTRODUCTION AND BACKGROUND . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 238
II. THE MAJORITY . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 242
A. The First Circuit . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 242
B. The Third Circuit . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 244
C. The Fifth Circuit . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 247
D. The Seventh Circuit . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 249
E. The Ninth Circuit . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 251
F. The Eleventh Circuit . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 252
III.
THE MINORITY . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 253
A. The Fourth Circuit . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 253
B. The Tenth Circuit . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 254
IV.
ANALYSIS AND IMPLICATION . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 256

*

DOI: https://doi.org/10.25172/smustlr.25.2.5
Chloe Cornett is a 2023 candidate for a Juris Doctor from SMU Dedman
School of Law. She received a Bachelor of Arts in Psychology from The University of Oklahoma in 2020.

238

V.

SMU Science and Technology Law Review

[Vol. XXV

A. “Majority Rules” . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
B. Why Mend the Split?. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
1. Uniformity . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
2. Efficiency . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
3. Percolation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
C. How to Mend the Split . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
CONCLUSION . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
I.

256
258
259
259
260
260
264

INTRODUCTION AND BACKGROUND

Imagine for a moment that no one was allowed to record the Minneapolis police officers and their violent interactions with George Floyd. Imagine
the footage that ultimately portrayed a radically different scene from how the
officers described that day was never allowed to be captured and, as a direct
result, never spread globally and never admitted in court.1 To imagine such
videotaping not being permitted is to experience the citizens living under the
law as interpreted by two United States Circuit Courts: the Tenth and Fourth
Circuits.2 While the old adage of “majority rules” might apply when picking
a restaurant or a flick for family movie night, the Supreme Court periodically
tolerates such differing interpretations among federal courts, and they are
known as “circuit splits.”3 Such splits are not a new legal phenomena, and
civilians, judges, and attorneys look to the highest court in the land to resolve
the legal discrepancy.4 While many splits have been addressed and remedied
in the past, this particular circuit discrepancy remains intact.5 The Supreme
Court has twice denied certiorari on this particular issue in the last ten years.6
Specifically, the circuits are divided as to whether there is an established
First Amendment right of civilians to record police officers in public and if

1.

See Audra D. S. Burch & John Eligon, Bystander Videos of George Floyd and
Others Are Policing the Police, N.Y. TIMES (Nov. 24, 2021), https://
www.nytimes.com/2020/05/26/us/george-floyd-minneapolis-police.html
[https://perma.cc/LWQ2-JDMZ].

2.

See infra Part III.

3.

Cornell Law School, Circuit Split, LEGAL INFO. INST. , https://
www.law.cornell.edu/wex/circuit_split [https://perma.cc/HQ9J-XXUW].

4.

Wyatt G. Sassman, How Circuits Can Fix Their Splits, 103 MARQUETTE L.
REV. 1401, 1403 (2020).

5.

See Nick Sibilla, Supreme Court Refuses to Protect First Amendment Right to
Film Police Brutality, FORBES (Nov. 2, 2021, 10:45 AM) (discussing the Supreme Court’s recent denial of certiorari on the issue, allowing it to percolate
further), https://www.forbes.com/sites/nicksibilla/2021/11/02/supreme-courtrefuses-to-protect-first-amendment-right-to-film-police-brutality/
?sh=7a5eb20e7d91 [https://perma.cc/FK5H-RWWY].

6.

See Tyler Finn, Qualified Immunity Formalism: “Clearly Established Law”
and the Right to Record Police Activity, 119 COLUM. L. REV. 445, 454 (2019).
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that right ultimately defeats the doctrine of qualified immunity.7 The Fourth
Circuit and Tenth Circuit do not currently recognize the filming of on-duty
police officers as a “clearly established” right under the First Amendment.8
These two circuits face strong disagreement from six other circuit courts,
clearly making their viewpoint the minority.9 The majority approach holds
that recording officers is a clearly established right protected by the First
Amendment.10 Circuits within the majority include the First, Third, Fifth,
Seventh, Ninth, and Eleventh Circuits.11 The majority view applies to some
of the largest and most densely populated states in the country like Texas,
California, and Florida.12 The Second Circuit, which includes New York,
Vermont, and Connecticut, has yet to produce binding caselaw addressing
this issue.13 The Sixth, Eighth, and D.C. Circuits have also not addressed the
constitutional merits of the right.14
Cases that fall within the ultimate question at the center of this split
typically involve three parties: (1) police officer(s), (2) the person interacting
directly with police, and (3) a bystander or otherwise uninvolved party that
records the interaction.15 There are also cases that center around an individual
recording a police building and then being approached by police officers because of the recording activity.16 Historically, these cases have shown that
once a police officer becomes aware of such filming, they command the individual to stop immediately.17 Even if there is such a right to record, the doctrine of qualified immunity is frequently relied upon by officers to justify
7.

See Jay Schweikert, Tenth Circuit Grants Qualified Immunity to Police Who
Knowingly Violated the First Amendment, CATO (Apr. 12, 2021, 2:04 PM),
https://www.cato.org/blog/tenth-circuit-grants-qualified-immunity-police-whoknowingly-violated-first-amendment [https://perma.cc/FP5B-36BF].

8.

Sibilla, supra note 5; Finn, supra note 6, at 455.

9.

See Billy Binion, The Supreme Court Declines To Determine if You Have a
First Amendment Right to Film the Police, REASON (Nov. 1, 2021, 3:16 PM),
https://reason.com/2021/11/01/the-supreme-court-declines-to-determine-ifyou-have-a-first-amendment-right-to-film-the-police/ [https://perma.cc/RU77GFJ8].

10. Sibilla, supra note 5.
11. Binion, supra note 9.
12.

Geographic Boundaries of United States Courts of Appeals and United States
District Courts, U.S. COURTS, https://www.uscourts.gov/sites/default/files/u.s._
federal_courts_circuit_map_1.pdf [https://perma.cc/AHY3-8MA2].

13.

See Finn, supra note 6, at 459.

14.

Id.

15.

See, e.g., Fields v. City of Philadelphia, 862 F.3d 353, 356 (3d Cir. 2017).

16.

See, e.g., Turner v. Lieutenant Driver, 848 F.3d 678, 683 (5th Cir. 2017).

17.

See, e.g., Fields, 862 F.3d at 356.
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their actions.18 Qualified immunity is an affirmative defense used by public
officials to shield them from liability in civil suits alleging violation or infringement of a particular right.19 So long as the violated right is not a
“clearly established statutory or constitutional rights of which a reasonable
person would have known,” then the defendant-official is protected from liability.20 This is a high bar for the plaintiff to overcome in light of the fact that
courts follow a broad qualified immunity approach which affords greater
protection to government officials.21 The doctrine attempts to strike a balance
between two vital concerns: (1) holding public officials responsible should
they wield their power inappropriately, and (2) protecting those officials
from badgering, disturbing, or otherwise counterproductive interactions that
prevent them from doing their job.22 Government officials keep people safe,
but they must not have not have limitless discretion in doing so.23 It is important to understand that this immunity protects a government official from
lawsuits alleging the official violated a plaintiff’s rights, and the doctrine
only allows suits where officials violated a clearly established statutory or
constitutional right.24 Explained differently, “qualified immunity is applicable unless the official’s conduct violated [a citizen’s] clearly established constitutional right.”25

18.

See, e.g., id.

19.

See Finn, supra note 6, at 447.

20.

Id.

21.

Id.

22. Cornell Law School, Qualified Immunity, LEGAL INFO. INST., https://www.law.
cornell.edu/wex/qualified_immunity#:~:text=%E2%80%9CQualified%20immunity%20balances%20two%20important,Callahan%20 [https://perma.cc/
BRZ2-7Y7G].
23.

See id.

24.

Id.

25. Eugene Volokh, First Amendment right to videotape police extends even to
probationers, and to one’s own home as well as public places, WASH. POST.
(Aug. 11, 2014, 10:29 AM), https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/volokhconspiracy/wp/2014/08/11/first-amendment-right-to-videotape-police-extendseven-to-probationers-and-to-ones-own-home-as-well-as-public-places/ [https://
perma.cc/34HN-LW3L]; Eugene Volokh, First Amendment Right to Videotape
Police Extends Even to Probationers, and to One’s Own Home As Well As
Public Places, WASH. POST. (Aug. 11, 2014), https://www.washington
post.com/news/volokh-conspiracy/wp/2014/08/11/first-amendment-right-tovideotape-police-extends-even-to-probationers-and-to-ones-own-home-as-wellas-public-places/ [https://perma.cc/34HN-LW3L].
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This particular split is more relevant now than ever because virtually
every American has some sort of video camera at their fingertips daily.26
Video footage played on news channels and in courtrooms is no longer only
provided by television stations or police departments.27 Civilians of all ages
are capturing anything and everything, whether public officials like it or
not.28 Furthermore, these recordings enhance accuracy in describing incidents
or spreading information due to the objective nature of recordings.29 People’s
recollections of what they saw or heard can be tainted with subjective bias.30
Respecting and making proper use of civilian recordings fosters a discrete
shift in the societal power balance as well.31 Now that cameras are regularly
in the hands of the public and officers alike, those who have historically been
without the power to capture their surroundings can now do so.32 This right
to record can lead to the power to expose and hold accountable individuals
and abusive practices that otherwise have gone unseen, unappreciated, and
unchecked.33 Additionally, sharing footage captured by the public sparks important nationwide conversation, much like the Black Lives Matter social
justice revolution after the George Floyd footage spread worldwide.34 In order to ensure that police officers are held accountable for their actions, the
ability of civilians to record those officers while on active duty cannot face
hurdles or burdensome limitations like “professional credentials or status.”35
This right must be protected by the First Amendment, which applies broadly
to all regardless of profession.36
This Comment furthers the argument that the majority’s perspective
should prevail, eliminating the approach held by the minority circuits, and
that all circuits should find that the right to record police officers in the
course of their employment is a clearly established right within the First
Amendment. In Parts II and III, this article summarizes the relevant caselaw

26.

See How Many Americans Have Smartphones (2011-2021), OBERLO, https://
www.oberlo.com/statistics/how-many-americans-have-smartphones [https://
perma.cc/DF4L-BHTV].

27.

See Glik v. Cunniffe, 655 F.3d 78, 84 (1st Cir. 2011).

28.

See id.

29.

Fields, 862 F.3d at 359.

30.

Id.

31.

See Chapter Four: Considering Police Body Cameras, 128 HARV. L. REV.
1794, 1816 (2015).

32.

See id.

33.

See id.

34.

See Fields, 862 F.3d at 359.

35.

See Glik, 655 F.3d at 84.

36.

See id. at 83.
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on the issue within each circuit.37 Part IV discusses why the majority approach is preferable, as it achieves public policy and constitutional goals, and
how, as well as why, this split should be settled, uniting the circuits on this
issue once and for all.38
II.
A.

THE MAJORITY

The First Circuit

In 2011, the First Circuit made it clear that police officers in that jurisdiction do not easily reap the benefits of qualified immunity when it comes to
being filmed on the job by civilians.39 While standing a short distance away
from an active arrest, Simon Glik videotaped the encounter as he believed
that he saw the officers punch the man being arrested.40 One of the officers
asked Glik if he captured the altercation on video, to which Glik responded
that he had.41 The officer then arrested Glik and took him to the South Boston police station, where his cellphone and other tech devices were confiscated.42 Glik was later charged with “violation of the wiretap statute,
disturbing the peace, and aiding in the escape of a prisoner.”43 With all
charges being either dismissed or dropped, the Boston Municipal Court noted
that “the fact that the ‘officers were unhappy they were being recorded during an arrest . . . does not make a lawful exercise of a First Amendment right
a crime.’”44
In early February of 2010, Glik filed suit against the police officers as
well as the City of Boston.45 Specifically, in his suit he alleged that his First
and Fourth Amendment rights were infringed during the original incident in
2007.46 In response to Glik’s § 1983 claim, the defendants asserted that the
suit must be dismissed due to the protections stemming from the doctrine of
qualified immunity.47 The assertion heavily relied on the claim that it was
“not well-settled” law that the right to record officers is a constitutional
37.

See infra Parts II-III.

38.

See infra Part IV.

39.

See Appeals Court Unanimously Affirms Right to Videotape Police, ACLU
(Aug. 29, 2011), https://www.aclu.org/press-releases/appeals-court-unanimously-affirms-right-videotape-police [https://perma.cc/NC7J-EZUW].

40.

Glik, 655 F.3d at 79–80.

41.

Id. at 80.

42.

Id.

43.

Id.

44.

Id.

45.

Id.

46.

Glik, 655 F.3d at 80.

47.

Id.
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one.48 But the district court was not convinced and held that such a right was
indeed clearly established in the First Circuit.49
In hopes of a reversal, the defendants appealed to the First Circuit where
the district court’s ruling was unanimously affirmed.50 In the dual issue inquiry, the court found that Glik’s First Amendment rights were indeed infringed upon and that the right to record on-duty public officials is clearly
established and protected by the First Amendment.51 With regard to the first
question asking if the appellee’s First Amendment rights had been compromised, the court had no difficulty in determining that the Amendment protects methods of communication beyond those explicitly enumerated in the
text.52 The First Circuit in its opinion emphasized that recording officers falls
under the umbrella of the types of acts the First Amendment seeks to protect,
such as obtaining and dispersing information about public officials.53 The
holding was not the first of its kind, as the court noted that other circuits also
concluded “that the First Amendment protects the filming of government officials in public spaces.”54 This privilege is not exclusive to official news
outlets and press publications but also applies to the general public.55 Noting
that “news stories are now just as likely to be broken by a blogger at her
computer as a reporter at a major newspaper,” the court emphasized that First
Amendment protections extend to average passersby attempting to disseminate information they legally gathered.56
The second inquiry as to whether the right to film was clearly established did not stump the judges of the First Circuit either.57 The court found
the cases appellants relied on to be utterly unpersuasive and held that “a
citizen’s right to film government officials, including law enforcement officers, in the discharge of their duties in a public space is a basic, vital, and
well-established liberty safeguarded by the First Amendment.”58 The court
addressed the balance sought by qualified immunity by noting that public
officials are required to perform their duties in spite of obstacles that arise
from citizens acting in accordance with their First Amendment protections.59
48.

Id.

49.

Id.

50.

Appeals Court Unanimously Affirms Right to Videotape Police, supra note 39.

51.

See Glik, 655 F.3d at 82, 84–85.

52.

Id. at 82.

53.

Id.

54.

Id. at 83.

55.

See id. at 84.

56.

Id.

57.

See Glik, 655 F.3d at 85.

58.

Id. at 85.

59.

See id. at 84.
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The First Circuit acknowledged that there are sensible and rational limitations on the right to film, but Glik did not impermissibly push those limits in
his case.60 The court’s stance on civilians’ right to record police officers is
best summarized in its own words: “basic, vital, and well-established.”61
The First Circuit’s opinion is often characterized as pro-protectionist on
behalf of civilians.62 Unlike a circuit in the minority group, the court in Glik
was not afraid to incorporate precedent and authority from neighboring circuits in its reasoning.63 The First Circuit addressed the constitutional question
again three years later in Gericke v. Begin.64 The court affirmed and reiterated the core holding of Glik when it expanded the right to include interactions at traffic stops as such a situation “does not extinguish an individual’s
right to film.”65
B.

The Third Circuit

In Fields v. City of Philadelphia, the Third Circuit filled a hole it created
in an prior opinion and elected to join the “growing consensus” among circuits on the issue of First Amendment protections for civilian’s filming police when it stated that “the First Amendment protects the act of
photographing, filming, or otherwise recording police officers conducting
their official duties in public.”66 While the court acknowledged that it held
that the recording right was not clearly established seven years earlier, it
declared that it had not yet ruled on the First Amendment right issue.67 In the
earlier case, the Third Circuit affirmed the district court’s summary judgment
in favor of a police officer after concluding that the caselaw on the First
Amendment question did not provide the court with a definite rule to work
with.68
In the Third Circuit’s first case concerning the First Amendment recording question, Brian Kelly was riding in the passenger seat of a vehicle driven
by his friend, Tyler Shopp.69 The car was stopped by police officer David
Rogers, and Shopp was subsequently questioned.70 Kelly began recording the
60.

Id.

61.

Id. at 85.

62.

See generally Finn, supra note 6, at 455.

63.

Id.

64. Gericke v. Begin, 753 F.3d 1, 2 (1st Cir. 2014).
65.

Id. at 7.

66.

Fields, 862 F.3d at 356.

67.

Id. at 357.

68. Kelly v. Borough of Carlisle, 622 F.3d 248, 262 (3d. Cir. 2010).
69.

Id. at 251.

70.

Id.
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conversation between Rogers and Shopp on his personal portable camera.71
Officer Rogers’s attention shifted from Shopp to Kelly when he noticed that
Kelly had a recording device in his lap.72 Rogers confiscated Kelly’s camera
and arrested him after calling for additional police presence.73 Kelly’s sworn
statements revealed he heard one of the backup officers say to him, “when
are you guys going to learn you can’t record us.”74
The District Attorney brought charges against Kelly for violating a local
wiretap act, but those charges were ultimately dropped, and, as a result, Kelly
filed suit a § 1983 suit for infringement of his First and Fourth Amendment
rights against both Officer Rogers and the Borough of Carlisle.75 The defendants filed for summary judgment in response to Kelly’s suit, which was
granted by the district court.76 Despite his appeal efforts, the Third Circuit
affirmed the district court’s holding, and Kelly’s allegations failed once
again.77 The core of the court’s holding was that there was no clear-cut, established rule on First Amendment protections and recording police officers.78 The Third Circuit was not inclined to extend any First Amendment
precedent to these traffic stop facts.79 As a direct result of the Court’s conclusion that there was no clearly established right, summary judgment in favor
of Officer Rogers was affirmed.80
A few years later, the Third Circuit again faced a case with facts similar
to those in Kelly.81 In 2012, Amanda Geraci attended a protest in Philadelphia as an observer.82 When a protestor was arrested during the event, Geraci
attempted to position herself to better videotape the arrest.83 Although careful
not to interfere with police proceedings, Geraci was physically restrained by
an officer and did not see the active arrest or capture any of it on her recording device.84 About a year later, college student Richard Fields witnessed
71.

Id.

72.

Id.

73.

Id. at 251–52.

74.

Kelly, 622 F.3d at 252.

75.

Id.

76.

Id.

77.

Id. at 266.

78.

Id. at 262–63.

79.

See id.

80.

Kelly, 622 F.3d at 266.

81.

See Fields, 862 F.3d at 356.

82.

Id.

83.

Id.

84.

Id.
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police officers tending to a situation at a home.85 Fields took a picture on his
cellphone from across the street where he was standing at the time of his
observation.86 After an officer saw Fields snap the photograph, the officer
approached Fields and commanded him to move along.87 Fields refused to do
so.88 At that point, the police officer arrested Fields, took his cellphone, detained him, and cited him for roadway obstruction.89 Ultimately, Fields was
freed and the charges were dropped.90
Pursuant 42 U.S.C. § 1983, Geraci and Fields sued the City of Philadelphia and certain Philadelphia police officers for infringing upon their First
and Fourth Amendment rights.91 But the district court granted summary
judgement for the defendants on the First Amendment claims based on qualified immunity.92 On appeal, the Third Circuit stated at the outset that the
issue before the court was one of “great importance” and acknowledged that
recording police officers is not at all a rare occurrence.93 The same court that
waivered on how to approach the question of whether the First Amendment
right existed in Kelly delivered a clear conclusion on the central question in
Fields.94 The overall holding reads like a loss for individuals like Geraci and
Fields because the court affirmed the officers’ entitlement to qualified immunity protections.95 But the real win is rooted within the court’s recognition
that the First Amendment right to “photograph, film or audio record” officers
exists going forward.96 Qualified immunity had to be granted by the court in
light of their concession that this right did not exist at the time of Geraci and
Fields’s police interactions in 2012 and 2013, respectively.97 Judge Ambro
justified the court’s position on the constitutional question with considerations of First Amendment principles and societal benefits.98 The opinion posited that video and audio recordings lie “squarely within the First
85.

Id.

86.

Id.

87.

Fields, 862 F.3d at 356.

88.

Id.

89.

Id.

90.

Id.

91.

Id.

92.

Id.

93.

Fields, 862 F.3d at 357.

94.

Id. at 357–58.

95.

See id. at 360.

96.

Id.

97.

Id. at 362.

98.

See id. at 359–60.
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Amendment right of access to information.”99 And, importantly, this right is
not only granted to the press but also to the general public.100 Addressing
societal concerns, Judge Ambro explained the essential role that the public
plays in keeping police officers accountable for their impermissible actions.101 Such actions can include editing or misconstruing dash camera footage, or disregarding essential ethical practices.102 The court claimed that
simply just “recording, regardless what is recorded, may improve policing,”
and civil rights preservation.103
C.

The Fifth Circuit

Much like Geraci and Fields, Philip Turner’s case embodies the phrase
“wrong place, wrong time” in the sense that his case marked the end of one
approach taken by the Fifth Circuit and sparked the beginning of another.104
In 2015, Mr. Turner stood across the street from the Fort Worth Police Station and simply videotaped it with his tablet device.105 Police officers observed Turner’s actions and approached him with suspicion.106 The
interaction between Turner and the officers started off relatively relaxed but
ended with Turner’s arrest.107 The officers asked him for identification and
why he was filming the station, but Turner provided neither an ID or a reason
for recording.108 This prompted the officers to place Turner in handcuffs and
into the back of a police car without his video camera.109 Lieutenant Driver
arrived to the scene and talked for a while with the two arresting officers.110
After conversing with both the officers and Turner, Driver released Turner
and gave him the camera back.111
Three years after the incident, Turner filed suit against all three officers
under § 1983 alleging that his First, Fourth, and Fourteenth Amendment
rights were transgressed.112 But, the officers’ motion to dismiss based on
99.

Fields, 862 F.3d at 359.

100. Id.
101. See id.
102. Id. at 360.
103. Id.
104. See Turner, 848 F.3d at 687–88.
105. Id. at 683.
106. See id.
107. Id. at 683–84.
108. Id. at 683.
109. Id.
110. Turner, 848 F.3d at 684.
111. Id.
112. Id.
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qualified immunity ultimately prevailed at the district court.113 The court held
that Turner “failed to show that [the officers’] actions violated any of his
clearly established statutory or constitutional rights or that their actions were
objectively unreasonable.”114
Turner’s appeal to the Fifth Circuit triggered the court to address the
past and discuss the future to establish a new direction on the question of
First Amendment protections when videotaping police officers.115 Most unfortunately for Turner, the court held that “no clearly established First
Amendment right to record the police” existed in 2015, when Turner’s situation unfolded.116 But, in recognition of the importance and prevalence of the
issue, the court made it clear that such a right to record officers under the
First Amendment was now clearly established going forward.117 The court
explained that at its most basic core, the First Amendment preserves freedoms of speech and press.118 Under that umbrella falls judicially recognized
activities like gathering news, sharing ideas and information, and recording
methods.119 Moreover, there is almost complete consensus on the belief that
the Amendment’s primary goal was to protect the free discussion of governmental affairs.”120 In light of those truths and findings of law, the Fifth Circuit adamantly held that the right Turner was claiming was now firmly and
clearly established.121
The court provided further justification for recognizing the right by explaining the importance of police accountability and accuracy.122 To permit
people to record police officers is to keep the great power they wield in
check.123 Public officials serve the people, and when the power of those officials is beyond the reach of the people’s opinion, democracy can suffer.124
Furthermore, this right to record can actually benefit public officials too.125 In

113. Id.
114. Id.
115. Id. at 685–90.
116. Turner, 848 F.3d at 687.
117. Id. at 687–88.
118. Id. at 688.
119. Id. at 688–89.
120. Id. at 689.
121. Id. at 690.
122. See Turner, 848 F.3d at 689.
123. See id.
124. See id. at 689-90.
125. Id.
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situations that boil down to differences in recollections of a situation, video
footage can serve as the truthteller and can dispel inaccurate assertions.126
D.

The Seventh Circuit

In what was explicitly characterized as a “test case,” the Seventh Circuit
spoke to the First Amendment question in the context of recording police
officers in American Civil Liberties Union of Illinois v. Alvarez.127 The factual circumstances of this case is different than other cases surrounding the
same issue because the American Civil Liberties Union (ACLU) filed this
suit under § 1983 as a “preenforcement” effort against the Cook County
State’s Attorney in Chicago, Anita Alvarez.128 Specifically, the ACLU
wanted to prevent Alvarez from enforcing an Illinois eavesdropping law.129
The statute seems to hinge on consent and sound.130 Under the law, anyone
who recorded “all or any part of any conversation” would be charged with a
Class 4 felony unless all participants in the communication exchanged consent.131 The charge would increase to a Class 1 felony should any of the
parties in the recording be a police officer executing the obligations of their
profession.132 While it was permissible to take silent recording of officers at
work, a simple “on” switch of a microphone places the individual recording
the officer in Class 1 felony territory.133 An interesting carveout of the statute
pertained to police officers: they were permitted to record any and all civilian
interactions without their consent.134
The ACLU’s issue with the statute honed in on their ability to operate
their program focused on accountability of police officers.135 The program
involved recording police officers at work in public places and intended to
capture their movements and speech that could be seen and heard by those
around them.136 The captured material would then be posted online and distributed via other media and entertainment platforms.137 Out of fear of prosecution of its cameramen due to these recording activities, the ACLU halted
implementation of the accountability program and filed suit to prevent en126. Id.
127. ACLU of Ill. v. Alvarez, 679 F.3d 583, 586 (7th Cir. 2012).
128. Id.
129. Id.
130. See id.
131. Id.
132. Id.
133. Alvarez, 679 F.3d at 586.
134. Id. at 587–88.
135. Id. at 588.
136. Id.
137. Id.
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forcement of the statute.138 The ACLU encountered a few procedural issues
with the district court on requirements such as standing and injury.139 Ultimately, the district court disposed of the ACLU’s case on the basis of the
“right to audio record” not being protected by the First Amendment.140
On appeal, the Seventh Circuit rescued the ACLU’s claim and corrected
the legal misunderstandings of both the State’s Attorney and the district
court.141 The court focused on how the specific provisions of the Illinois law
ran afoul with Constitutional protections within the First Amendment.142
State eavesdropping and wiretapping statutes are permissible, to be sure.143
But as the Seventh Circuit noted, when those laws are too sweeping, First
Amendment protections can be eliminated in the process.144 The law challenged by the ACLU is a perfect example of what overly inclusive and broad
eavesdropping legislation looks like.145 “All audio recording of any oral communication absent consent of the parties” is prohibited.146 Further, the parties’ intent on the speech remaining public or private is not considered.147 At
the core of its holding, the Seventh Circuit explained that because audio and
visual videotaping are within the protections afforded to speech and press
under the First Amendment, the Illinois statute is limited in what it can restrict and cannot be as broad as it seeks to be.148 The gathering process is one
of the first steps in the overall system of speech, and restricting one of the
steps compromises the essence of freedom of speech overall.149 This holds
true because gathering, creating, and disseminating speech are not separated
by harsh, black-and-white dividing lines.150 Rather, all those activities are
shades of gray within the color of expression of speech itself.151 To restrict
the gathering process is to restrict the communication altogether, and to restrict that communication is to infringe on a First Amendment right.152
138. Id.
139. Alvarez, 679 F.3d at 588.
140. Id. at 589.
141. Id.
142. See id. at 607.
143. See id. at 607–08.
144. See id. at 595.
145. See Alvarez, 679 F.3d at 596.
146. Id. at 595.
147. Id. at 586.
148. See id. at 596.
149. Id. at 595.
150. Id. at 595-96.
151. Alvarez, 679 F.3d at 595–96.
152. Id. at 598.
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The Ninth Circuit

Although only addressed in one paragraph, the Ninth Circuit made it
clear that it operated under the majority’s approach on the First Amendment
recording question in its holding in Fordyce v. City of Seattle.153 Jerry Edmon
Fordyce attended a Seattle protest with his video camera in tow.154 At some
point during the protest, Fordyce’s actions irked police officers to the point
of physically preventing him from filming the protest further.155 Fordyce escaped arrest at that moment, but was later arrested that same day during another altercation in which he filmed pedestrians.156 Charges against Mr.
Fordyce were brought pursuant to a Washington privacy statute but were
ultimately dropped.157
Among other things, Fordyce brought suit against the City of Seattle
and various officers under § 1983 for allegedly infringing upon his First
Amendment rights.158 But on the basis of qualified immunity, the district
court granted the officers’ motion for summary judgement as to the § 1983
claims.159 While the Ninth Circuit affirmed several aspects of the district
court’s holdings, it reversed and remanded the § 1983 claims pertaining to
the physical altercation that occurred.160 In the court’s opinion, “a genuine
issue of material fact [did] exist regarding whether Fordyce was assaulted
and battered by a Seattle police officer in an attempt to prevent or dissuade
him from exercising his First Amendment right.”161
It is essential to read this opinion with the understanding that qualified
immunity cannot apply if the officer’s conduct violated an individual’s
clearly established constitutional right.162 The court recognized Fordyce’s
filming as an action that would trigger acknowledgment of infringement of
an activity rooted in a constitutionally protected activity and would thus defeat a claim of qualified immunity.163 As such, the court’s granting of summary judgement shows where the court stands.164 Although not stated as
explicitly as other circuit opinions, the Ninth Circuit’s opinion in Fordyce is
153. See Fordyce v. City of Seattle, 55 F.3d 436, 442 (9th Cir. 1995).
154. Id. at 438.
155. Id.
156. Id.
157. Id.
158. Id.
159. Fordyce, 55 F.3d at 438–39.
160. Id. at 442.
161. Id. at 439.
162. Volokh, supra note 25.
163. Finn, supra note 6, at 446 n.9.
164. Id.
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consistently cited as precedent of an established right to record police officers under the First Amendment.165
F.

The Eleventh Circuit

While the Smiths did not get the relief they sought on appeal, the Eleventh Circuit made important statements in its relatively short opinion on the
issue of First Amendment recording of police officers by civilians.166 In
Smith v. City of Cumming, Mr. and Mrs. Smith filed a § 1983 suit against the
City of Cumming and Earl Singletary, the Chief of Police.167 The Smiths
claimed that they suffered harassment at the hands of Cumming police officers.168 More importantly, they alleged that Mr. Smith’s First Amendment
rights were violated when he was not permitted to record the officers in action.169 The district court granted the defendants’ motion for summary judgment, and the Smiths appealed.170
The Eleventh Circuit affirmed the district court’s ruling but corrected an
error of the lower court by explicitly stating that it had “erred in concluding
that there was no First Amendment right” when granting summary judgment.171 To prevail on their § 1983 claim, the Smiths had to satisfy two requirements: (1) have the type of right that qualified immunity applies to, and
(2) show that the right was indeed deprived or compromised.172 The Smiths
met the first requirement but not the second.173 As a result, the Eleventh
Circuit affirmed the district court’s ruling.174 But the court’s recognition that
the Smiths were correct when they asserted that they had a constitutional
right at the center of the issue is the important precedent set by the Eleventh
Circuit.175

165. Volokh, supra note 25.
166. Smith v. City of Cumming, 212 F.3d 1332, 1333 (11th Cir. 2000).
167. Id. at 1332.
168. Id.
169. Id.
170. Id.
171. Id. at 1333.
172. Smith, 212 F.3d at 1333.
173. Id.
174. Id.
175. Volokh, supra note 25.
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THE MINORITY

The Fourth Circuit

Compared to the Tenth Circuit, the Fourth Circuit’s stance on the First
Amendment recording issue is much less solidified.176 Although the unpublished per curiam opinion affirmed the district court, “unpublished opinions
are not binding precedent in” the Fourth Circuit.177 Nevertheless, the 2009
decision is consistently recognized as following the minority approach on the
split issue.178 Mrs. Szymecki claimed that her husband was forcefully removed from a local festival because he brought his handgun to the public
event.179 Officers informed Mr. Szymecki that he needed to rid himself of the
weapon before reentering the festival per city code.180 When he did not comply with the officers’ order, additional police arrived on the scene, and that is
when Mrs. Szymecki claims that things got physical between the officers and
her husband.181 At that point, she started filming the situation but was allegedly shoved, threatened, and removed from the park where the festival was
held.182
Several months later, Mrs. Szymecki filed suit under § 1983 against the
officer who first communicated with her husband and then later called for
backup, Deputy Houck.183 Mrs. Syzmecki claimed that Houck violated her
First and Fourth Amendment rights.184 Houck moved to dispose of
Syzmecki’s claims on the basis that she did not allege an applicable constitutional right.185 The district court granted Deputy Houck’s motion for summary judgement because it concluded that “the specific right implicated . . .
was not clearly established at the time” of the incident, and therefore, qualified immunity prevailed.186
In response, Szymecki appealed to the Fourth Circuit.187 In its rather
short opinion, the court affirmed the district court without hearing any oral
176. See generally Finn, supra note 6, at 455.
177. Szymecki v. Houck, 353 F. App’x 852 (4th Cir. 2009).
178. Finn, supra note 6, at 455.
179. Szymecki v. City of Norfolk, No. 2:08CV142, 2008 WL 11259782, at *1 (E.D.
Va. Dec. 17, 2008).
180. Id.
181. Id.
182. Id.
183. Id.
184. . Id.
185. Szymecki, 2008 WL 11259782, at *2.
186. Id. at *4.
187. Szymecki, 353 F. App’x at 852.
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argument.188 The court used a quite narrow lens and explained that only
caselaw from the Fourth Circuit itself or the Supreme Court will be considered when determining if a constitutional right is clearly established.189 Because the Supreme Court has not ruled on this issue, and there is no binding
precedent in the Fourth Circuit, the court did not have to use this case to
finally state their conclusion and stance on the issue.190 Although the court
confronted the First Amendment issue at the center of this circuit split, it
dodged having to actually put forth binding precedent and therefore sits in
the minority view group.191
B.

The Tenth Circuit

Of all the circuit caselaw on the First Amendment issue, Frasier v. Evans is the most recent case and has reignited much passionate discussion.192
The Tenth Circuit’s ruling was issued in March 2021 and the Supreme Court
denied certiorari a several months later.193 Rather than answering the First
Amendment question for all circuits, it is evident that the Supreme Court will
allow the split to persist for now.194 Mr. Frasier witnessed Denver police
officers beating a man in August 2014.195 To the officers’ disdain, the entire
altercation was recorded by Frasier.196 Police approached and surrounded
Frasier, one of them telling him the daunting “we could do this the easy way,
or we could do this the hard way” threat.197 With no warrant and no consent
from Frasier, the officers grabbed the recording device and rummaged
through it trying to locate the video.198 Frasier’s footage was saved from
destruction as the officers never found it.199 But, the officers’ fears came true
when Frasier submitted the footage to a local news station and it was publicly
aired.200

188. Id. at 853.
189. Id. at 852-53.
190. Finn, supra note 6, at 455.
191. Id.
192. See generally Sibilla, supra note 5.
193. See id.; see also, Frasier, 992 F.3d at 1003.
194. See Sibilla, supra note 5.
195. Id.
196. See id.
197. Id.
198. Id.
199. Id.
200. See Sibilla, supra note 5.
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As the community witnessed the misconduct of the officers, Frasier
filed suit.201 Frasier prevailed on his First Amendment claim in the district
court when it did not grant the officers qualified immunity.202 Although it
held that the right to film public officials during the course of their duties
was not a clearly established right, the court based its conclusion on another
fact.203 In the years leading up to Frasier’s altercation with police, Denver
officers had been commanded to “respect the public’s ‘right to record them
performing their official duties in public spaces.’ ”204 Moreover, the Department of Justice set forth in a letter to the Baltimore Police Department recommendations and advice for police officers across the country on the right
to record officers.205 Their guidance explicitly stated that officers should be
aware that “individuals have a First Amendment right to record police officers,” citing cases from circuits that echo that conclusion like Glik, Smith,
and Fordyce.206 As a result, the district court denied the officers qualified
immunity not on the basis of a right to record being clearly established but on
the fact that “the officers actually knew from their training that people have a
First Amendment right to record them in public.”207
In response, the officers appealed the district court’s ruling to the Tenth
Circuit.208 Writing for the majority, Judge Holmes expressed deep disagreement with the district court’s alternative basis used to reach its holding.209
Judge Holmes defeated the lower court’s opinion on two separate but equally
potent lines of reasoning.210 First, the Tenth Circuit clarified that how the
officers viewed the law is wholly subjective and that qualified immunity is
only analyzed with an objective lens.211 In the Tenth Circuit’s opinion, subjective understanding is “irrelevant” to a qualified immunity analysis.212 Second, if that reasoning was not enough to correct the district court, Judge
Holmes provided another justification for finding error.213 The court explained that police training is not an “interpretive source” in a “clearly-estab201. Id.
202. Frasier, 992 F.3d at 1008.
203. Id.
204. Sibilla, supra note 5.
205. Letter from Jonathan M. Smith, Chief of Special Litigation Section, Dep’t of
Just., to Mark H. Grimes, Baltimore Police Dep’t (May 14, 2012).
206. Id. at 2–3.
207. Frasier, 992 F.3d at 1008.
208. Id. at 1009.
209. See id. at 1013–23.
210. Id. at 1015.
211. Id.
212. Id.
213. Frasier, 992 F.3d at 1015.
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lished-law inquiry.”214 Judicial precedent shall be the only controlling source,
and the district court acknowledged that they had no such precedent to rely
on in its holding.215 Frasier cited persuasive law from numerous cases and
commentary but the Tenth Circuit was not moved by any of it due to the
nature of the citations: concurrences, dicta, and opinions from other circuits.216 Judge Holmes characterized the district court’s analysis as “erroneous rationale” and granted police officers in the Tenth Circuit more leeway
when he stated that “even if officers subjectively kn[o]w . . . that their conduct violated” an individual’s First Amendment rights that qualified immunity shall still be granted as the right remains unestablished.217
IV.
A.

ANALYSIS AND IMPLICATION

“Majority Rules”

In this particular circuit split, the conclusions and opinions of the majority viewpoint are the correct interpretation as it best upholds public policy
concerns and is undoubtedly rooted in our constitution.218 The minority position is out of step with both public policy considerations and foundational
pillars of this nation’s Constitution and, thus, should be defeated in favor of
the majority’s approach.219
One of the most compelling public policy concerns served by the majority’s stance on this issue is police accountability.220 Providing dual benefits
and strengthening the integrity of police officers behooves both the general
public’s and states’ interests.221 The population at large desires to capture and
make accessible the incidents they witness without fear of search and
seizure.222 The popular motto “see something, say something” loses all effect
when those who see something are too afraid to say something, and as a
result, the pertinent incident goes unaddressed.223 The state maintains an interest in maintaining a credible and efficacious law enforcement depart-

214. Id.
215. Id. at 1015, 1019.
216. Id. at 1016–18.
217. See id. at 1019.
218. See infra Part IV.
219. See infra Part IV.
220. See generally Raoul Shah, Cop-Watch: An Analysis of the Right to Record
Police Activity and Its Limits, 37 MITCHELL HAMLINE L.J. PUB. POL’Y & PRAC.
215, 228 (2017).
221. See generally id. at 223–33.
222. See id. at 233.
223. See id. at 232–33.
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ment.224 Further, the recordings could serve as essential evidence in trial
proceedings, thus enhancing the courts’ pursuit of justice.225
Alongside officer accountability lies the public policy concern of consistency among jurisdictions.226 It is concerning that officers in the minority
view states could escape liability for the same actions that the majority would
not let slide.227 This inconsistency typically manifests as a benefit to the defendant-officer in minority jurisdictions.228 Of course, the majority’s approach would not create such an automatic advantage for police officers who
should potentially be held accountable.229 This inconsistency affects civilians
as well.230 Some individuals enjoy the freedom to record officers and share
what they gather, while other fellow Americans live an almost censored life
with respect to recording their government officials.231
A more social justice-oriented policy interest is furthered by the majority’s view, too.232 Historically underrepresented or disrespected populations
can be acknowledged as the community representatives they are by allowing
their captured footage to be absorbed by the necessary parties.233 These
groups—women, racial minorities, and those with disabilities, for example—
can put forth evidence that supersedes real or socially constructed barriers
that accurately convey real experiences and incidents that deserve attention.234 Properly utilizing information is a way governments can promote and
enforce justice in courts and with the press.235 Empowerment at the individ224. See id. at 229.
225. See generally id. at 233.
226. See generally Finn, supra note 6, at 452.
227. See The Supreme Court Hasn’t Ruled on Whether Recording the Police is a
First Amendment Right. This Could be the Year It Does., FIRST AMEND.
WATCH AT N.Y. UNIV. (Aug. 27, 2021), https://firstamendmentwatch.org/thesupreme-court-hasnt-ruled-on-whether-recording-the-police-is-a-first-amend
ment-right-this-could-be-the-year-it-does/ [https://perma.cc/Y45Z-LMZH].
228. Finn, supra note 6, at 452.
229. See generally The Supreme Court Hasn’t Ruled on Whether Recording the Police is a First Amendment Right. This Could Be the Year It Does., supra note
227.
230. See generally Clay Calvert, The First Amendment Right to Record Images of
Police in Public Places: The Unreasonable Slipperiness of Reasonableness &
Possible Paths Forward, 3 TEX. A&M L. REV. 131, 140–41 (2015).
231. See generally id. at 141.
232. See generally Chapter Four Considering Police Body Cameras, supra note 31,
at 1801-07.
233. See generally id. at 1798–802.
234. See id. at 1798–99.
235. See Duncan Green, The Role of the State in Empowering Poor and Excluded
Groups and Individuals, UNITED NATIONS (Jul. 2013), https://www.un.org/esa/
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ual level within that citizen recording police is an “essential precondition” for
collective change.236
The majority approach rules when it comes to abiding by the protections
and goals of the U.S. Constitution.237 The First Amendment promises Americans that Congress will “make no law[s] . . . abridging the freedom of
speech, or of the press; or the right of the people peaceable to assemble, and
to petition the Government for a redress of grievances.”238 Per interpretation
by the Supreme Court, the First Amendment protects citizens’ ability to
gather and spread information without the government stifling the public’s
access to such information.239 The Supreme Court emphasized the importance of speech’s ability to inform the public by explaining that such ability
does not stem from the gatherer and sharer of the information.240 “[W]hether
[the source is a] corporation, association, union, or individual,” information
benefits the public.241 The central issue of this circuit split is implicated on
the front end of the freedom of speech timeline.242 How can one be free to
share information that they are prohibited from gathering in the first place?
This paradox resolves itself under the majority’s approach because one is not
prevented from gathering what one is later free to share to the public.243 The
essence of the First Amendment could be hollowed out by the minority’s
perspective by telling civilians that they can share what they please but with
the caveat that, what can be gathered is significantly limited.244
B.

Why Mend the Split?

Of course, the public policy and constitutional concerns make it clear
that this disagreement among the circuits should be mended.245 On a more
systematic level, three broad and functional aspects of circuit law are enhanced when the circuits are all on the same page: (1) uniformity, (2) efficiency, and (3) percolation.246
socdev/egms/docs/2013/EmpowermentPolicies/Background%20Paper.pdf
[https://perma.cc/66X8-N7GM].
236. Id. at 3.
237. See generally Shah, supra note 220, at 223–33.
238. U.S. CONST. amend. I.
239. Shah, supra note 220, at 223.
240. First Nat’l Bank of Boston v. Bellotti, 435 U.S. 765, 777 (1978).
241. Id.
242. See Alvarez, 679 F.3d at 595.
243. See, e.g., id.
244. See generally id.
245. See supra Part IV(a).
246. Sassman, supra note 4, at 1437.
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Uniformity

While each of the circuits addressed in this comment has intercircuit
uniformity and consistency within its own particular circuit, there is a lack of
uniformity between the circuits: intracircuit uniformity.247 Given the advantages modern life affords us to easily and readily float between jurisdictions,
it is a legal truth that most Americans will be affected somehow by intracircuit inconsistencies.248 Some individuals might reside in one circuit for the
vast majority of their lives, but far more individuals migrate between the
states and ultimately between the circuits for life milestone moments, such as
educational, familial, and professional pursuits.249 These pursuits could be
comprised by inconsistencies within the circuits and result in unfair, unpredictable, and unstable outcomes.250
Under the circuit doctrine, uniformity within a circuit is more important
than uniformity between circuits.251 This prioritization directly compromises
the advantages of intracircuit consistency by sparking litigation within other
circuits and shaking up precedent within the circuits involved in the issue.252
Lack of uniformity can also lead to “circuit shopping” and flooding some
jurisdictions and courts with suits more than others.253
2.

Efficiency

Somewhat in the same vein as uniformity, circuit splits compromise efficiency of jurisprudence.254 How efficient can a legal system be when its
own laws are applied unevenly and unequally?255 Probably the most common
advantage set forth in favor of mending circuit splits is that when the circuits
are unified, judicial efficiency is enhanced because judges need not make
time intensive inquiries.256 The benefit of efficiency sits at the end of a domino effect of judicial proceedings ruled by uniformity.257 The theory is that
when splits are fixed and the circuits all agree, conflict decreases workload
247. Id. at 1438.
248. Id.
249. See generally id.
250. Id.
251. Id. at 1443.
252. Sassman, supra note 4, at 1443.
253. Deborah Beim & Kelly Rader, Legal Uniformity in American Courts, 16 J.
EMPIRICAL LEGAL STUD. 448, 451 (2019).
254. Id.
255. See generally id.
256. Sassman, supra note 4, at 1444.
257. See id. at 1446.

260

SMU Science and Technology Law Review

[Vol. XXV

and time that must be spent on each case, therefore efficiency increases.258
Justice Cardozo summarized this principle when he stated that “the labor of
judges would be increased almost to the breaking point if every past decision
could be reopened in every case.”259
3.

Percolation

Circuit percolation is the idea that conflicting precedent shall stand for a
while before the Supreme Court hears the issue.260 Proponents of the approach argue that tolerating the clashing caselaw for a time ultimately allows
for more material to develop, giving the Court more reasoning and perspective to consider.261 It is essential to recognize that percolation is limited, and
strife cannot and should not be tolerated for too long.262 The percolation period allows the circuits to communicate and exchange methodologies which
is beneficial.263 But, should percolation last too long, circuits can lock-in on
their own precedent and become less and less willing to hear competing
precedents.264 This “lock-in” often leads circuits to listen only to their own
precedent and refuse any and all precedent from non-binding courts, such as
other circuits.265 Moreover, studies show that more caselaw within a split
does not mean that the split is more likely to be resolved.266 On the other
hand, it is unknown if the Court’s certiorari denial is just procrastination or if
it means that the Court never plans to resolve the split.267 It is clear that the
Supreme Court is allowing this First Amendment issue to percolate further.268
The question as to whether it has percolated too long remains unanswered.
C.

How to Mend the Split

The first approach to settle this First Amendment split that likely comes
to mind is to petition again for the Supreme Court to establish a final rule that
puts all the circuits on the same page.269 This approach is the most formal one
258. See id.
259. See id. at 1445.
260. Id. at 1447–48.
261. Id. at 1448.
262. See Sassman, supra note 4, at 1450.
263. See id.
264. Id.
265. Id. at 1431.
266. Beim & Rader, supra note 253, at 2.
267. Id. at 6.
268. See Sibilla, supra note 5.
269. See id. (highlighting the number of entities that turned to the Supreme Court for
resolution of the issue).
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that can be used to resolve a division between the circuits.270 Additionally, a
split among the circuits is one of the strongest indicators of Supreme Court
review.271
There are both advantages and disadvantages of the Supreme Court certiorari approach.272 Some of the hurdles include the Court’s unchallengeable
discretion to decline certiorari273 and the Court’s shrinking docket size.274
Political researchers believe that the Court prefers to address splits that are
highly divisive and truly split the circuits down the middle.275 More “shallow” and less controversial splits seem to concern the Court less and are
often not granted certiorari.276 But other circumstances still affect whether the
Court grants certiorari or not.277 Timing, factual intricacies, whether a particular party petitions for certiorari, and the Court’s own unique discretion all
contribute to the Court’s ultimate decision to employ judicial review;278
along with the Court’s discretion is the issue of shrinking docket size.279 The
courts’ caseload makes a triangle with the Supreme Court at the top and the
lowest federal courts at the bottom.280 The disproportional docket sizes have
led some analyses to question whether our highest court can even handle all
the current issues and if uniformity among the courts is a lost cause.281 But,
there is a reason so many petition to the Supreme Court in hopes of judicial
review in spite of these potential downsides.282
A special benefit the Court settling a circuit split is that the decision
speaks to both “sleeper” circuits and the “origin” circuit.283 The origin circuit
is the circuit that produced the case that the Court granted certiorari to.284
270.
271.
272.
273.
274.
275.
276.
277.
278.
279.
280.
281.
282.

283.
284.

Beim & Rader, supra note 253, at 4.
Id. at 1.
See generally Sassman, supra note 4, at 1451–62.
See Karen M. Gebbia, Circuit Splits and Empiricism in the Supreme Court, 36
PACE L. REV. 477, 479 (2016).
Sassman, supra note 4, at 1403.
Beim & Rader, supra note 253, at 5.
Id.
See Gebbia, supra note 273, at 504–05.
Id.
See Sassman, supra note 4, at 1403.
See id. at 1409.
See id.
See A Reporter’s Guide to Applications Pending before the Supreme Court of
the United States, PUB. INFO. OFF. SUP. CT. OF THE U.S., https://
www.supremecourt.gov/publicinfo/reportersguide.pdf [https://perma.cc/ZB5S7QZW].
See Gebbia, supra note 273, at 504–5.
Id. at 498.
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Sleeper circuits are circuits who have spoken on the issue at the center of a
split but they were not granted certiorari.285 A Supreme Court decision on a
circuit split reveals to what degree the Court accepts or rejects the legal reasoning and rulings of all sleeper circuits and the origin circuit.286 Such a
ruling also directly impacts silent circuits that have not spoken on the issue at
all because all circuits are bound by Supreme Court caselaw.287 Moreover,
this approach strengthens one of the Court’s core responsibilities: the law’s
ultimate “conflict-resolver.”288
Other legal scholars advance that a different method to mend circuit
splits enables the circuits to settle the differences on their own.289 Advocates
of this approach argue that if circuits could relax their strict and rigid adherence to considering only their own precedent and instead consider holdings
and reasonings of fellow courts, the circuits could fix their own rifts.290 This
would require somewhat loosening what is known as the “law of the circuit”
doctrine.291 This doctrine is a firm, inflexible rule “that a panel of a federal
court of appeals may not revisit the decision of a prior panel on the same
court.”292 Only a modification in caselaw from a superior court permits this
revisitation.293 All the circuit courts abide by this rule, but the important
catch is that the application of the rule varies from court to court.294 While
one court allows consideration of persuasive, non-binding precedent, others
disagree on what a change in “higher authority” even means.295
The strict nature of the circuit doctrine is not how things have always
been either.296 Historically, the circuits operated much more flexibly before
this new rigid methodology became commonplace in the late 1900s.297 So
pulling back on the severity of the doctrine would not be novel, it would be
returning to what was previously the norm.298 But under the current rule’s
strict confines, circuits effectively have horse blinders on and do not con285. Id. at 503 n.77.
286. . See id. at 505.
287. See, e.g., Payne v. Taslimi, 998 F.3d 648, 654 (4th Cir. 2021).
288. Sassman, supra note 4, at 1450.
289. See id. at 1451.
290. See id.
291. Id.
292. Id. at 1426.
293. Id. at 1426-27.
294. Sassman, supra note 4, at 1427.
295. Id. at 1427-28.
296. See id. at 1428.
297. See id. at 1428-29.
298. See id. at 1428.
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verse with each other which, unsurprisingly, creates gridlock.299 The courts
become cemented in their position on an issue, making resolution extremely
difficult at best.300 An example of how this tunnel vision can complicate resolution among the circuits is the Fourth Circuit’s reasoning in Syzmecki301 and
the Tenth Circuit’s holding in Fraiser.302 If the Court permitted consideration
of other circuits in the majority’s precedent and sources that led to their holdings, perhaps the holding could have been different, leaving only the Tenth
Circuit out of step with the other courts and essentially not being a real split
at all.303 Advocates of an approach like this postulate that even if the conflict
is not totally mended, considering factors and findings in other circuits leads
to “further development of the issue by better articulating its position.”304
Those who favor this method also argue that it would decrease reliance
on the Supreme Court to resolve conflict and alleviate some strain on the
federal court system.305 If the circuit courts make use of the legal methodologies and other “tools already available” to them, they could increase the overall rate at which circuit conflicts are actually resolved.306 Arguably the most
compelling benefit of this less rigid consideration approach is that the courts
could render more sound decisions.307 Genuine communication between the
circuits would likely enhance confidence in the legitimacy of the federal
court system and might lead to legal minds discussing respective caselaw that
previously would not have been addressed.308
Of course, this approach has its downsides.309 The law and those who
practice it value predictability, and this change could compromise that to
some degree.310 Perhaps the most consequential risk of this approach is the
potential implication of destabilizing what rights are and are not clearly established in constitutional issues.311 Whether or not the right of citizens to
film police officers is a clearly established right within the First Amendment
is at the center of the circuit split this article addresses. It is true that some
cases have come down to the exact moment at which the court decided when
299. See id. at 1431.
300. See Sassman, supra note 4, at 1431–32.
301. See Szymecki, 353 F. App’x at 852.
302. See Frasier, 992 F.3d at 1015.
303. See Sassman, supra note 4, at 1452.
304. See id.
305. See id. at 1453.
306. See id. at 1454.
307. See id. at 1456–57.
308. See id.
309. Sassman, supra note 4, at 1460.
310. See id. at 1460.
311. See id. at 1462-63.
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this right was in fact clearly established.312 So if that determination is not
fixed in time and is susceptible to subsequent alteration, there could be dire
consequences relating to consistency, constitutionality, and equality.313
Whether the former or later approach is adopted, if any effort to mend the
split is taken at all, there are benefits and risks.314 It would not be surprising
if another petition for certiorari is filed since, as previously explained, we as
a society are comfortable with the Supreme Court having the final say and
being the conflict resolver.315
V.

CONCLUSION

Americans cherish their constitutional rights, especially the freedom of
speech, and do not take lightly threats to this pillar of what it means to be an
American.316 The reality is that citizens seeking to gather information are
everywhere; camera phones are in every hand, and police officers are in all
states and cities. This means the potential for another First Amendment case
like the ones this article addresses is endless.317 Therefore, the split dividing
the circuit courts should be done percolating and settled because the core of
the issue is not going anywhere anytime soon.318 Furthermore, the majority’s
perspective should prevail if the essential underpinnings of the U.S. Constitution are to be preserved and for crucial public policy considerations to be
advanced further.319 Police accountability, consistent treatment of civilians
seeking to exercise the same right, utilization of information from historically
underrepresented groups to promote equality in information dissemination,
and the ability to discuss governmental affairs without unreasonable limitations are concerns that cannot go unaddressed any longer.320 Therefore, a
method to settle this split must be selected. The rich discussion surrounding
this issue cannot die down, but, rather, it must get louder if we, Americans
with constitutional protections, want those with the power to fix this split, to
fix it once and for all.
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